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Abstract
Guaranteed interest rates and capital guarantees have been standard features in life in-
surance savings products in German-speaking countries. Life insurers sold products with
interest rate guarantees up to 4% in the 1990s and still had an average guaranteed rate of
about 3% in their in-force books in 2014. Since savings contracts are long-term contracts,
the duration of such policies typically exceeds the duration of the insurers’ assets. Thus, the
current low-interest rate environment has increased pressure on the profitability of life in-
surers. As a consequence, insurers are developing products with alternative return schemes
and moving away from fixed interest rate guarantees. This raises the question to what
extent guaranteed interest rates and capital guarantees are valued by the customers and
if these features can be compensated for by other benefits like higher expected returns or
alternative investment profiles. To provide an answer to this question, we analyze data from
a unique representative market study of the German population carried out in Germany
in 2014. Based on a choice-based conjoint analysis, we estimate individual part-worth util-
ities through the hierarchical Bayes model. Our main findings include that the guaranteed
capital amount is the attribute affecting customer preferences the most. Further, partic-
ipating life insurance products offering guarantees are always preferred even if alternative
products without guarantees offer expected returns that are more than three times higher.
Such results are highly relevant for the developing life insurance business.
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1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, the yields on government bonds with maturities of up to ten years have been
decreasing within OECD countries (Holsboer, 2000; Li et al., 2007; Bernoth et al., 2012; Capelle-
Blancard et al., 2019). While the returns have been significantly above 4% per annum in the
past, they are nowadays below 1% and even negative in some countries (Arias et al., 2016;
Tokic, 2017). This low-interest rate environment as well as the long running nature of life
insurance contracts threaten the profit margin of insurers offering guaranteed interest rates or
capital guarantees (Grosen and Jørgensen, 2000; Consiglio et al., 2008; Schmeiser and Wagner,
2015; Eling and Schaper, 2017). Recently, the European Insurance and Occupational Pen-
sions Authority (EIOPA, 2015) has identified the low yield phenomenon as one of the main
risks for European life insurers (Pablo et al., 2011; Becker and Ivashina, 2015). In fact, due
to the significant amount of guarantees in their books, life insurers have experienced financial
distress in the past, e.g., Equitable Life in England, Garantie Mutuelle des Fonctionnaires in
France and Mannheimer Lebensversicherung in Germany (Rymaszweski and Schmeiser, 2011;
Schmeiser and Wagner, 2015). To protect insurers’ policyholders, regulators have revised sol-
vency regulatory frameworks in the last decade. New standards require insurance companies to
hold significant amounts of capital when proposing such guarantees (Devolder, 2011; Reuß et al.,
2015; Niedrig, 2015). In this context, Germany has been one of the most affected countries since
its market is characterized by a high share of long-term contracts with interest rate guaran-
tees (Gatzert, 2010; Maurer et al., 2013; Möhlmann, 2017). As things stand, a prolonged phase
of low interest rates would lead to the bankruptcy of many insurers (Kling et al., 2007; Kablau
and Wedow, 2012; Berdin and Gründl, 2015). While German authorities have responded by
adjusting (lowering) the maximum technical interest rate for new business (Deutsche Bundes-
bank, 2018), i.e. the maximum rate at which life insurance companies are allowed to discount
future cash flows, insurers have developed products without fixed interest rate or capital guar-
antees (Gatzert and Schmeiser, 2013; Reuß et al., 2016). Indeed, this allows insurers to be less
constrained to risk-free investments and enables to design products allowing for investments
in more risky assets (Huang, 2010; Berry-Stolzle et al., 2011; Krieger, 2016). This is particu-
larly relevant in times of low yields where such strategies allow for a win-win situation between
insurers and their policyholders (Mirza and Wagner, 2018). Therefore, offering high financial
guarantees currently appears outdated; nevertheless, at the moment, no substitute convincing
all customers has been found. On the one hand, individuals have often non-rational prefer-
ences (Slovic et al., 2002; Cutler et al., 2008; Zweifel and Eisen, 2012) making the replacement
of guarantees a complex topic. On the other hand, preferences are heterogeneous and depend
on many socioeconomic factors (Feldman and Schultz, 2004; Bohnert et al., 2014; Braun et al.,
2016). As a consequence, several major insurers like Zurich, Generali and ERGO have moved
away from the classical guarantee business (Fromme, 2015).
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we want to find out, which product characteristics
are the ones that have the highest affect an individual utility. Second, we analyze under which
conditions a customer would purchase a product without fixed guarantees in Germany. More
precisely, we investigate on changes in preference for guarantees when an individual can choose
among products with different risk-return features. We base our study on novel data stemming
from a survey conducted in 2014 among 1 000 individuals. Using the theoretical framework of
choice-based conjoint (CBC) analysis as well as the hierarchical Bayes (HB) model, we are able
to evaluate consumer preferences along demographic and socioeconomic factors.
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While customer preferences have been broadly studied in non-life and health insurance (see,
e.g., Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2004, Van den Berg et al., 2008, and Tselentis et al., 2018),
only few studies have clearly analyzed customer preferences for life insurance savings products
with financial guarantees (Boyle and Tian, 2008; Branger et al., 2010). Based on a CBC frame-
work, Braun et al. (2016) analyze customer preferences and the willingness-to-pay for term
life insurance contracts. In their study, they find that the premium, the insurance brand, the
presence of a critical illness cover and the underwriting procedure are the major factors influ-
encing customer choices. Customer preferences for participating life insurance contracts under
the assumption of a fair pricing by the insurer are studied by, e.g., Døskeland and Nordahl
(2008). Given different customer preferences regarding the various contract parameters guar-
anteed interest rate, annual surplus participation rate and terminal surplus participation rate,
Gatzert et al. (2012) recommend a segmentation of customers according to their preferences
to maximize the customers utility and thereby willingness-to-pay while keeping the contract
value fixed for the insurer (see also Gatzert et al., 2011). Although the optimal level of the
guaranteed interest rate depends on the individual customer, a lower rate can be beneficial for
the customer (Schmeiser and Wagner, 2015). Indeed, given the recently introduced solvency
requirements, guarantees are expensive in terms of the capital needed by the insurers. More
risky but potentially rewarding investment strategies are difficult to put in place. Chen et al.
(2019) study the optimal asset allocation guided by policyholders’ preferences in innovative
retirement products. An explanation why customers nonetheless favor products with guaran-
tees can be derived by using a behavioral model which factors in the concept of loss aversion
(Døskeland and Nordahl, 2008). Some papers try to explain the demand for guarantees by
Kahnemann/Tversky’s prospect theory (see, e.g., Døskeland and Nordahl, 2008, Dierkes et al.,
2010, Chen et al., 2015, Ruß and Schelling, 2018). In the present research, we use a CBC
framework with HB estimations to analyze the preferences when choosing insurance (Wellman
and Vidican, 2008). When compared to ratings and rankings, the CBC approach is the most
suited for measuring individual preferences since it requires less detailed comprehension of the
marketplace and therefore can be representative of the whole population (Huber, 1997). Indeed,
choice tasks closely mirror real purchase situations of potential customers and the method has
become common in market research. Further arguments for the method and a discussion of the
theoretical foundations from random utility theory can be found in Braun et al. (2016, Sect. 2.1
and 2.2). The theoretical framework for a CBC is best presented by the series of Sawtooth
Software CBC-related research publications, see, e.g., Orme (2009).
The key results from our study indicate that individuals have strong preferences for guaran-
teed life insurance products when confronted with riskier alternatives proposing higher yields in
the absence of financial guarantees. Analyzing customer preferences, we find that the amount of
guaranteed capital is the attribute with the highest influence on the product selection. In such
context, one could think that individual demographic, socio-related and economic savings char-
acteristics importantly shape preferences. Indeed, risk preferences may be different in men and
women and investment preferences vary among customers with different income or education
levels. However, our outcomes do not support such hypotheses and highlight that decisions are
mostly driven by product characteristics such as the presence of guarantees and the highlighted
expected returns. Aside these conclusions, we state that individual preferences are heteroge-
neous and that the granularity of our analysis does not allow to properly distinguish decision
patterns. Therefore, most of our results focus on mean preferences. By studying combinations
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of guarantees and expected returns, we note that a product offering a higher level of flexibility
and an individualized asset allocation, letting customers reallocate assets in a secure investment
if desired, appears to be the preferred alternative to the traditional products with guarantees.
Nevertheless, such schemes are only considered by customers when the expected returns are
high enough.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the German
life insurance market describing the main products as well as the development of premium
shares, technical interest rates and rates of returns. We describe the survey design and provide
descriptive statistics on the observed responses in Section 3 and we outline the theoretical
framework of the CBC approach and the HB model in Section 4. We present and discuss our
results along part-worth utilities, relative attribute importance and product switching behavior
with respect to the shares of preferences in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Landscape of the life insurance business in Germany
In the following, we describe the size and structure of the life insurance market and consider
the regulatory and economic framework in Germany (Section 2.1). Then, in Section 2.2, we
showcase the development of the business to highlight the specifics of the German market with
its high prevalence of products with guaranteed interest rates. We also discuss the increasing
pressure on profitability on both the new and the in-force business in an ongoing low interest
rate environment.
2.1 German life insurance market
In terms of premiums volume, the German life insurance sector ranks among the ten largest
markets worldwide (Swiss Re, 2019).1 Five products are sold by German life insurers: First,
endowment insurance pays out a lump sum at maturity to the policyholder in case of survival or
to a designated beneficiary in case of death. Second, annuities and pension insurance guarantee
recurrent payments under specific conditions and for a specific period of time. Both prod-
ucts are participating life insurance contracts and usually include a guaranteed interest rate.
Each year policyholders participate in the insurer’s surplus and the interest rate guarantee is of
cliquet-style type. This means that the policyholder’s reserves are credited with the technical
interest rate on a yearly basis. All returns are locked in, increase the guaranteed amount and
next periods’ interest rates are applied to them (Bohnert and Gatzert, 2011; Eling and Holder,
2013b). Then, unit-linked contracts of endowment and annuity types differ from the previous
ones by promising higher returns but leaving the financial risk to policyholders. Unit-linked
investments are separated from those of traditional contracts since neither the capital nor the
interest rate are guaranteed. Instead, benefits are determined based on the fair value of units
of a mutual fund (CEA, 2007). Finally, group life insurance covers a body of people typically
working within the same company and the bucket “supplementary insurance” includes, e.g.,
accident or disability insurance riders (Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft,
GDV, 2019).
1In Germany, with 45.8% of the premiums, life insurance business is more important than non-life (34.5%)
and private health insurance (19.7%, Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, 2019).
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The sector has undergone important regulatory and economic changes in the past years.
On a national level and based on the pension reform from 2001, the “Riester-Rente”, a State-
sponsored retirement provision, was introduced in January 2002 (GDV, 2004). Further, the life
insurance reform act (“Lebensversicherungsreformgesetz”) and the retirement income act (“Al-
terseinkünftegesetz”) became fully effective in 2015. The first law was enacted by the regulator
to ensure the financial viability of life insurance companies and thereby the protection of insur-
ance customers in the prevailing low interest rate environment (Elsner, 2015). The second act
changed the way pensions are taxed in Germany (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, BMF, 2019).
Other regulatory changes such as the introduction of the European General Data Protection
Regulation (Goddard, 2017) and the Insurance Distribution Directive (De Maesschalck, 2017)
have affected insurance companies. From an economic perspective, the burst of the dot-com
bubble at the beginning of the century and the global financial crisis with the resulting difficult
market conditions and low interest rate environment have put pressure on the life insurance
business (Hieber et al., 2015; Demary and Matthes, 2014).
2.2 Premium shares, technical interest rates and rates of returns
Premium shares In Figure 1, based on numbers reported by GDV (2019), we lay out the de-
velopment of premium shares along life insurance products in Germany for the period from 1990
to 2018. We observe three main developments in that period. First, endowment products lose
their dominant market position from 82% in 1990 to about 26% in 2018 while annuity and pen-
sion products increase their market share from 5% to 31%. In absolute numbers, endowment
policies are with almost 23e bn in 2018 on the same level of gross written premiums than in
1990, showing the overall increase of the life insurance business in Germany. To a large extent,
this is due to regulatory changes increasing the attractiveness of annuity and pension products
while lowering the one of endowment products. For example, the introduction of the “Riester-
Rente” contributed to a rising popularity of annuity and pension products. The Riester pension
plan is a private plan where customers profit from State subsidies and tax exemptions. It has
largely contributed to the shift towards pension products in Germany. Indeed, this product was
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Figure 1: Development of life insurance product shares from 1990 to 2018.
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Figure 2: Government bond yields and maximum technical interest rates from 1990 to 2018.
introduced to close the pension gap from the statutory pension system and was heavily adver-
tised (Eckardt et al., 2018). At the same time, following the retirement income act (GDV, 2004),
taxation laws have become less favorable for lump sum payouts. Second, the life insurance busi-
ness is dominated by products with interest rate guarantees, although their share is decreasing
from 87% in 1990 to 57% in 2017 (sum of endowment, annuities and pension insurance). Third,
unit-linked products gain market share. While almost nonexistent in 1990, the market share of
unit-linked contracts has continuously grown up to 18% in 2018.
Technical interest rates The yield of government bonds and the maximum technical inter-
est rate are key drivers for new life insurance business. Set by the BMF, the maximum technical
interest rate represents the maximum rate at which life insurance companies are allowed to dis-
count future cash flows. As a key matter for insurance companies, nonbinding recommendations
are provided by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the German Association of
Actuaries.2 In Figure 2, we report the evolution of the government bond yields and the maxi-
mum technical interest rate to be applied for new business in the period between 1990 and 2018.
It is important to note that such changes only affect new business and not in-force contracts.
Set at the level of 3.5% in 1990, the maximum technical interest rate has raised to 4.0% in 1994
to account for government bonds’ yields above 8% (Favero et al., 1997; Koivu et al., 2005). The
rate remained at 4.0% until July 2000, when it was lowered to 3.25%. From this date on, the
rate has continuously decreased to 2.75% in January 2004, to 2.25% in January 2007, to 1.75%
in January 2012 and to 1.25% in January 2015. The latest adjustment to 0.9% was made in
January 2017, only two years after the last change. Despite these adjustments, the graph shows
that since 2012 the maximum technical interest rate for new business is above the average yields
on German government bonds. Thus, new business with guarantee products is hardly profitable
2For setting the maximum technical interest rate, the BMF uses a method based on the five-year rolling
average of the yields of German government bonds (AAA-rated) with maturities between 9 and 10 years (GDV,
2014). Thereby, the new rate must not exceed 60% of the calculated average (Eling and Holder, 2013a). Since the
introduction of the Solvency II regime in 2016, the regulatory requirements for the maximum technical interest
rate and its calculation method are no longer mandatory. Nonetheless, the BMF decided to continue with the
current system until sufficient experience with the new solvency regime has been gained.
6
Year
R
a
te
 (
in
 %
)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
2
.0
2
.5
3
.0
3
.5
4
.0
4
.5
5
.0
Net return on investments
Average return on investments
Average technical interest rate in force
Figure 3: Investment returns and market portfolios’ average technical interest rate between 2008
and 2018.
in the current low-interest rate environment.
Rates of returns In Figure 3, we illustrate the development of the net return on invest-
ment, the alternative return on investment and the market portfolios’ average technical interest
rate (numbers are taken from Deutsche Bundesbank, 2018). The overall average technical inter-
est rate has slowly decreased (from 3.4% in 2008 to 2.75% in 2018), because changes in the rate
only affect new contracts (as described above). Average returns on investments, representing
the net return on investment adjusted for extraordinary income and expenditures, have contin-
uously decreased from 4.7% in 2008 to less than 3.5% in 2018. In comparison, the net return
on investments, computed as the investment income minus the investment expenses divided by
the annual average investments, has followed a different trend over the same period (German
Council of Economic Experts, 2016). This is relevant, since German life insurers have improved
their net return on investment by realizing high amounts of valuation reserves. As a conse-
quence, the net return on investments still exceeds the portfolios’ average technical interest rate
by 0.9 percentage points in 2018. When adjusted for extraordinary effects, the excess is only 0.3
percentage points. The increasing profitability pressure on new business and the in-force port-
folio requires insurers to develop products with alternative policyholder return schemes. They
need to move away from fixed interest rate guarantees, but need to develop products that are
nonetheless attractive to customers. This raises the question to what extent guaranteed interest
rates and capital guarantees are valued by the customers and if these features can be compen-
sated for by other benefits like a higher expected return or an attractive investment concept.
Finding an answer to this question using data from a customer survey is the objective of this
study.
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Would you buy the selected product if it would be offered on the market?
Yes, that looks like a good product for me.
No, I would rather look for other offers.
Guarantee: security
for your pension
You invest in the strong
traditional fund of the
insurer and profit from
its diversified investment
and high safety level.
The insurer guarantees a
payout of g of the initial
capital at the term of
the contract.
With this safe investment
you can expect an annual
return of rG.
Real estate: stable
return hedged with
first-rate real estate
You invest in first-rate
commercial real estate
situated in top locations
in Germany.
Given the stable rental
income of the real estate
in the portfolio, annual
returns have not dropped
below 3% in the last
five years.
With this investment you
can expect a medium-
term annual return of rR.
Anti-cyclic: capital
market opportunities
& active risk control
The investment offers an
asset management notion
allowing to participate
in market developments.
You are protected against
return fluctuations by
a hedging strategy.
You can expect medium-
term annual returns of rA.
Historical returns show
that target returns have
rarely been missed and
only when unusual market
developments occurred.
Opportunity:
promising return
You design your own
investment strategy from
more than 100 funds
of various providers.
You can invest high yield
and expect a medium-
term annual return of rO.
If desired, you can invest
or reallocate your assets
in secure investments,
e.g., in times of
unfavorable market
developments.
Note: The attributes g, rG, rR, rA and rO take different values (levels) in each scenario. The original
cards are presented in German language.
Figure 4: Illustration of the survey set up with four proposed products per investment scenario.
3 Survey design and descriptive statistics
3.1 Concept of the survey and collected covariates
Survey design The survey is composed of two parts. In the first part, participants are asked
to provide information on demographic (gender and age), socio-related (children, income, em-
ployment, financial decisions and education) and economic factors (savings motivations and
products). In the second part, respondents are guided into a choice-based study and set into
the following situation (translated from the original German text):
“You would like to invest 10 000 e for your retirement provision. Your financial advisor presents
you four products that meet all your requirements but differ regarding the expected risks and re-
turns. You have to evaluate product information in eight scenarios and in each scenario you
have to choose the product that is most appealing to you.”
After reading the aforementioned text, participants are exposed to eight different investment
scenarios. In each scenario, they must choose one among four products with different risk-return
characteristics and say if they would or would not buy the selected product. Participants are
always facing the same combination of four types of products. We illustrate one such scenario
in Figure 4. As we lay out below, in each of the scenarios the proposed attributes have different
levels and product types are presented in a randomized order.
The first proposed product is named “guarantee” (G) and offers both capital and interest
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rate guarantees. In the CBC design, this product has two attributes. They are the capital
guarantee as percentage g (110%, 100% or 90%) of the initial capital and the guaranteed interest
rate rG that takes values conditioned by the value of g. When g is equal to 110%, the interest
rate rG can take the following three low, medium and high values: 1.6%, 2.0% and 2.4%.
When g equals 100%, rG can be either 2.0%, 2.5% or 3.0%. Finally, when g is equal to 90%,
proposed values for rG are among 2.4%, 3.0% or 3.6%. The second product is called “real
estate” (R) as it invests the policyholder’s capital in real estate. It offers stable returns that are
hedged with first-rate German commercial real estate. While this products does not propose any
guarantees, the considered expected returns rR of 4.0%, 5.0% or 6.0% are higher when compared
to the guarantees in the first product. The characteristics of this product are close to the ones
of the “Swiss Life Premium Immo” product offered by Swiss Life (2019). We call the third
product “anti-cyclic” (A) since it combines investment that participate in market developments
with a return smoothing strategy protecting the portfolio against strong fluctuations. Without
guarantee, this product is expected to provide annual returns rA of 4.0%, 5.0% or 6.0%. The
design and the values of this product are based on the “Global Absolute Return Strategy Fund”
product offered by Aberdeen Standard Investments previously branded Standard Life (2001).
The last product is named “opportunity” (O) and lets customers make their own investment
decisions. In fact, customers can define the asset allocation by selecting investments from a
range of 100 funds from different providers. The product is said to provide expected returns rO
of 4.8%, 6.0% or 7.2%. Such product is representative of the product “Super for Life” from the
Australian financial group BT. We provide a synopsis of the attributes and the surveyed levels
in Table 1.
Attribute Levels
Type of product (p) Guarantee (G), real estate (R), anti-cyclic (A) and opportunity (O)
Capital guarantee (g) 90%, 100% and 110%
Interest rate (rG) 1.6%, 2.0% and 2.4% if g = 110%
2.0%, 2.5% and 3.0% if g = 100%
2.4%, 3.0% and 3.6% if g = 90%
Interest rate (rR) 4.0%, 5.0% and 6.0%
Interest rate (rA) 4.0%, 5.0% and 6.0%
Interest rate (rO) 4.8%, 6.0% and 7.2%
Table 1: Summary of the attributes and levels used in the survey study.
Covariates While the CBC study allows gathering potential customers’ preferences, the first
part of the survey is devoted to collecting participants’ characteristics.3 First, respondents
indicate their gender, their age along classes (see Table 3 for details) and if they have chil-
dren. Further, they give information about their yearly gross income. Then, they report their
current employment situation and their highest degree of education. For both, employment
situation and education, the proposed classes are taken from the standard categories proposed
by the German statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017). Due to additional complexity,
3The order in which the questions are asked in the study is not ideal since demographic and social-related
data should be collected at the end of the survey. Indeed, a conjoint analysis requires high cognitive effort of
the participants and therefore these questions about the products should be asked first. Nevertheless, socio-
demographic information is necessary to operate and balance the selection of participants to ensure a pool that
is representative of the population.
9
Product N Yes (in %) No (in %)
Guarantee 3 482 56.98 43.02
Real estate 1 283 60.56 39.44
Anti-cyclic 1 138 58.08 41.92
Opportunity 2 065 62.08 37.92
Note: The overall sum of N is equal to 7 968 and corresponds to the 996 respondents choosing 8 cards each. The
columns “Yes (in %)” and “No (in %)” respectively refer to share of responses selecting “Yes, that looks like
a good product for me.” and ”No, I would rather look for other offers.” to the question “Would you buy the
selected product if it would be offered on the market?” (see Figure 4). Values are expressed in % of N for each
product.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the product selection and the willingness to buy.
financial literacy is not controlled for. The present work only provides information through
proxies like age, employment and education. Further, participants provide information on their
involvement in financial decisions by indicating who makes the financial decisions in the house-
hold. Respondents must select one of the three following propositions: “I make the decisions
concerning finances in the household alone”, “I make the decisions concerning finances in the
household after coordinating with other members of the household”, and “Another member of
the household makes the decisions concerning finances in the household, taking into account
my opinion”. Respondents that are not involved in the financial decision taking are excluded
from the survey since we are interested in the subpopulation familiar with a household’s finan-
cial matters. Thereafter, a set of questions focuses on economic behavior regarding savings.
Participants indicate their top three personal motivations to save among the following: ful-
fillment of specific wishes (e.g., car, furniture, consumer electronics and vacation), real estate
acquisition, provisions for difficult times (e.g., unemployment, sickness), asset preservation and
growth, planning for retirement, provisions for children, and other.
3.2 Available data and descriptive statistics
The data for our study comes from the survey described in Section 3.1 and commissioned by
the Boston Consulting Group GmbH in 2014. The available dataset comprises complete records
from 996 participants. The pool of respondents is a representative subset of the general German
population. In order to avoid selection bias, the survey process and participant recruiting has
been outsourced to a professional polling company.
Product choice In each of the eight scenarios, the 996 respondents chose their preferred
product and indicate their willingness to buy the selected option (yes/no from the additional
question in Figure 4). Therefore, we account for 7 968 (= 8×996) responses informing on product
selection and willingness to buy. Among them, 3 482 choose the guarantee product, 2 065 the
opportunity product while 1 283 and 1 138 responses relate to the real estate and anti-cyclic
options, respectively (see the column N in Table 2). When considering the willingness to buy,
we note a quite homogeneous behavior along products, i.e. higher percentages indicating rather
a positive answer (yes) than a negative answer (no) to the question “Would you buy the selected
product if it would be offered on the market?”. Nonetheless, we note that responses in favor of
buying the opportunity product account for the highest share in willingness to buy (62%). In
Table 2, we report the product choices and the willingness to buy the selected products.
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Demographic factors
Age Gender
18 – 24 % 12.0 Male % 49.0
25 – 34 % 14.0 Female % 51.0
35 – 44 % 18.0
45 – 54 % 19.0
55 – 64 % 14.0
> 65 % 23.0
Socio-related factors
Children Employment Education
Yes % 64.0 Employed % 58.9 No school degree % 0.1
No % 36.0 In training % 9.1 Secondary school % 9.5
Yearly gross income (in e) Retired/inactive % 29.4 Intermediate school % 26.7
< 20 000 % 20.6 Unemployed % 2.6 Grammar school % 18.8
20 000 – 39 999 % 34.3 Financial decisions Vocational school % 16.1
40 000 – 59 999 % 20.0 Alone % 56.9 University of applied science % 11.8
60 000 – 79 999 % 11.1 With other household members % 37.9 University % 17.0
80 000 – 99 999 % 7.0 Influences decision of others % 5.2
≥ 100 000 % 7.0
Economic savings factors
Savings motivation (first choice) Savings motivation (second choice) Savings motivation (third choice)
Fulfillment of specific wishes % 44.4 Fulfillment of specific wishes % 22.5 Fulfillment of specific wishes % 13.6
Provision for difficult times % 14.0 Provision for difficult times % 24.1 Provision for difficult times % 18.3
Planning for retirement % 12.4 Planning for retirement % 15.7 Planning for retirement % 19.0
Real estate acquisition % 9.8 Real estate acquisition % 7.9 Real estate acquisition % 4.6
Asset preservation and growth % 9.4 Asset preservation and growth % 14.9 Asset preservation and growth % 15.6
Provision for children % 7.0 Provision for children % 11.8 Provision for children % 12.2
Other % 3.0 Other % 3.1 Other % 16.7
Nb. of individuals 996
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the participants’ demographic, social and economic factors.
Demographic, socio-related and economic savings factors In Table 3, we provide de-
scriptive statistics on the respondents’ demographic, socio-related and economic savings factors.
4 Theoretical framework
To perform our CBC analysis, we use a HB model. Such approach has been proven to perform
well for conjoint analysis (see, e.g., Arora et al., 1998; Halme and Kallio, 2014; Braun et al.,
2016). One of the main advantages of the HB approach is to improve the estimates while reduc-
ing the amount of required initial data, i.e. using shorter questionnaires. Indeed, this approach
allows providing accurate estimations even when the number of parameters per subject exceeds
the number of responses (Lenk et al., 1996). As a consequence, a high number of simulations
have to be performed (Fuchs and Schwaiger, 2006). The HB decomposes the estimation in
two stages. First, part-worth utilities are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution and
individual utilities are estimated by applying a multinomial logit model. In the second stage,
the relative importance of the attributes, i.e. their individual contribution to the overall utility,
is calculated.
Choice formulation Let us define Ci the choice of the respondent i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} and Uip
the utility he or she assigns to the product alternative p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , P}. In what follows, we
use a notation similar to Braun et al. (2016). In our case, the alternatives p correspond to the
four cards, i.e. four alternative products, presented in Figure 4 among which the respondent
has to choose (see also Table 1, here P = 4 and the possible values for p are G, R, A or O). By
considering respondents being utility maximizers, an individual i selects alternative p providing
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the highest utility level such as
Ci = p if Uip > Uim ∀m = 1, . . . , P, m 6= p. (1)
In other words, the above equation stipulates that the respondent i chooses alternative p if the
related utility Uip exceeds the utility Uim from any of the other alternatives. Therefore, Uip can
be decomposed into a deterministic and stochastic component (McFadden, 1974, 1986)
Uip = max(Ui1, . . . , UiP ) = Vip + ǫip, (2)
where Vip is the deterministic component identifying general preferences and ǫip is the stochastic
component highlighting specificity for a respondent i facing the alternative p. Following from
Equations (1) and (2), we define Pr(Ci = p) the probability that the respondent i selects the
alternative p as
Pr(Ci = p) = Pr(Uip > Uim) = Pr(Vip + ǫip > Vim + ǫim). (3)
Multinomial logit model Since the probability expressed in Equation (3) reduces to finding
the distribution of the maximum utility, we rely on extreme value theory and assume that
the ǫip are independent and follow a Gumbel distribution. From these characteristics, we deduce
that the utility maximization problem follows a conditional logit model (National Bureau of
Economic Research, 2007):
Pr(Ci = p) =
exp(Vip)
∑
m exp(Vim)
. (4)
Assuming the independence from the irrelevant alternatives property (IIA, cf. McFadden, 1986),
Equation (4) yields the following multinomial logit model for a given choice scenario:
Pr(Ci = p) =
∑
l exp(Xplβil)
∑
m,l exp(Xmlβil)
, (5)
where Xpl represents the proposed attribute levels l ∈ {1, . . . , L} of the alternative p that appear
in the particular scenario and the regression coefficients βil correspond to the ith individual
part-worth utility for the attribute level l.
Hierarchical Bayes estimation We estimate the unknown parameters βil in Equation (5)
using the HB estimation procedure. Therefore, in a first part, we estimate the distribution of
the coefficients’ vector β̄ assumed to be independently and identically distributed and stemming
from the multivariate normal distribution N(β̄,Σ) with mean vector β̄ and covariance matrix Σ
(prior distribution). Then, we use individual respondents’ characteristics for determining the co-
efficients βil (posterior distribution). The HB model likelihood function L(βil, β̄,Σ) is (Solgaard
and Hansen, 2003):
L(βil, β̄,Σ) = Pr(D | βil, β̄,Σ) =
∏
i,l
Lil(βil) ·N(βil, β̄,Σ), (6)
where D stands for the dataset recording all respondents’ choices and individual characteristics,
Lil is the likelihood for respondent i conditional on the respective coefficients βil. The fac-
tor N(βil, β̄,Σ) represents the normal distribution of the coefficients βi with mean β̄ and covari-
ance matrix Σ. For estimating the values of βil, we use the Sawtooth’s LightHouse CBC/HB 7.0
12
software.
Relative importance Since the regression coefficients βil corresponding to the part-worth
utilities of the individual i for an attribute level l have no intuitive economic interpretation,
a common usage in CBC analysis is to derive their relative importance. This metric ranges
from 0% to 100% and indicates the contribution of an attribute, say k, to the overall utility.
In this context, we introduce the notation lk representing the possible set of levels for the
attribute k. In other words, the indicator lk is a subset of l reporting only the possible levels
for an attribute k. The relative importance Rik of attribute k for a respondent i is
Rik =
maxlk(βilk) − minlk(βilk)
∑
k
(
maxlk(βilk) − minlk(βilk)
) , (7)
where βilk represents the regression coefficient corresponding to the part-worth utility for an
individual i and the k-th attribute with level lk .
5 Results and discussion
In this section, we present and discuss the numerical results obtained when applying our model
on the survey data. First, we report the part-worth utilities and relative attribute importance
that are the main ingredients for the further analyses (Section 5.1). Then, we look at both
individual and average preferences through product shares as well as product switching behavior
to provide input for optimal product design (Section 5.2).
5.1 Part-worth utilities and relative attribute importance
Part-worth utilities As a first model output, we consider the individual part-worth utilities
that give an overview of the contribution of each attribute and for all levels in the respondents’
choice. Thereby, higher path-worth utilities relate to higher level of utility. In Figure 5, we
present the cumulative distribution of part-worth utilities by attributes (graphs a–f) and levels
(curves in each graph). Focusing on the type of product attribute (Fig. 5a), we note that for
more than 80% of the respondents, the guarantee product provides higher utility than the three
other levels corresponding to the real-estate, anti-cyclic and opportunity products. Further,
respondents are about 60% to report a positive utility from the guarantee product alternative.
This observation yields a first signal for preferences towards guarantee-type products irrespective
of the levels of the related attributes, i.e. capital guarantee g and interest rate rG. Next, the
opportunity product shows a positive utility for about 45% of the participants while they are
less than 30% to have positive utility with regard to the real estate and anti-cyclic products.
We note that both last named options display a very similar pattern in the distribution of
part-worth utilities impeding a clear identification of the preferred alternative. For the other
five attributes (capital guarantee and interest rates), the part-worth utilities’ distributions lead
to findings without surprises. Indeed, with numerical measures that can be easily compared,
we find that higher levels of guarantees always lead to higher utility levels. For the capital
guarantee g, the level of 110% yields the highest utility while the level of 90% displays the
lowest (Fig. 5b). For the interest rate rG, the 3.0% level shows highest utility (Fig. 5c). For
both interest rates of the real estate (rR) and anti-cyclic (rA) product alternatives the value
of 6.0% presents the most important utility level (see Figs. 5d and 5d). Finally, regarding the
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Figure 5: Distribution of the part-worth utilities by attributes and levels.
interest rate rO for the opportunity product, highest utility values are reached with the value
of 7.2% (Fig. 5f). When comparing the range of the utility levels in each graph (x-axis), we
observe that the type of product and the capital guarantee in the guarantee product lead to
more importantly differentiated values than those implied by the various interest rates.
Relative attribute importance We now deepen our analysis by considering the relative
importance Rik metric (cf. Equation 7). The relative importance is the economic measure
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of an attribute’s contribution to the overall utility, no matter the specific level, i.e. value, of
the attribute. We present the distribution of the attributes’ importance in Figure 6. In each
graph, we lay out the 5% and 95% quantiles (q5% and q95%) as well as the mean value µ. With
a mean of 41.3%, we find that the type of product attribute has the most important effect
on respondents’ utility (Fig. 6a). The values of the distribution range from 0% to about 70%
indicating a contribution of up to 70% for some individuals’ overall utility. In terms of quantiles,
we find q5% = 16.4% and q95% = 61.1% reflecting the importance of this attribute on the
individual choice. Even though the observations relatively evenly spread between these values,
we find higher frequencies for relative importance levels in the range between 50% and 60%.
When considering the capital guarantee g, we evaluate the mean relative importance to 16.5%
setting this attribute as the second most important in terms of overall utility contribution. Most
of the values lie within q5% = 2.9% and q95% = 33.2% with higher frequencies around the mean.
Thereafter, while the mean relative importance for the interest rates rG and rR yield an identical
value (µ = 9.4%), the shape the distribution differs with frequency peaks observed above 10%
for rG and below 10% for rR. A slightly higher impact on the overall utility is observed for
the interest rate rA since we find a mean relative importance of 10.6%. Finally, the interest
rate rO yields µ = 12.7% with a 90%-corridor delimited by the values of 4.4% and 24.9%. This
classifies the interest rate of the opportunity product as the third most important attribute.
Regarding the distribution, the peak frequency is close to the mean value. Finally, let us note
that our empirical work does not include any attribute linking to the price or the value of the
products. Other studies (see, e.g., Braun et al., 2016) having considered a proxy of products’
price as an attribute, unsurprisingly show that such factor significantly influences buyers in a
way that clients most often present explicit preferences for the cheaper product.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the relative importance by attributes.
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5.2 Product shares and switching behavior
Individual and average product shares We now consider the distribution of the individ-
ual choices predicted by the model. Indeed, the HB estimation procedure allows obtaining an
estimate of the individual preferences for any combination of attributes and levels: our setup
with five attributes having each one three levels allows for 35 = 243 combinations (cf. Table 1).
Based on the 996 respondents, we are able to derive 242 028 (= 996 × 243) share estimates
corresponding to the complete set of attribute and level combinations.
In Figure 7, we lay out the distribution of product shares by individuals. The upper left
graph presents the set of estimated shares for the guarantee product (Fig.7a). While the mean
µ = 45.3% indicates that this product is selected in about 45 cases out of 100, the distribution
of the individual shares highlights important weights in the tails with highest frequencies of
shares below 2.5% and above 97.5%. This “binary” pattern is not present in the other graphs
where peaks only appear for shares below 2.5%. In the case of the real estate product, we
note an average share of about 15.4% with most results being located within q5% = 0.04%
and q95% = 73.8%. In comparison, the average share for the anti-cyclic product is slightly
lower (13.4%) and q95% reaches only 57.1%. At the end, the mean individual share for the
opportunity product is of 26.2%, putting it in second position after the guarantee product.
When reconsidering the distributions, we note high frequencies in the lower tail (below 2.5%),
however, non-negligible frequencies appear in the upper tail as well. While the guarantee prod-
uct is clearly the favorite option among the set of alternatives proposed in the survey, we
nonetheless observe a significant number of “0%” individual shares for this product. In other
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words, for a given set of attribute and level combinations in the other product types, individual
preferences do not report any share for the guarantee product. However, due to the hetero-
geneity in preferences in life and health insurance (see, e.g., Cutler et al., 2008, Polyakova,
2016, Braun et al., 2016) an obvious sequence of level combinations leading to recurrent in-
dividual preferences cannot be identified. For example, among the about 56 thousand (out
of 242 thousand) individuals’ shares for the guarantee product that appear below 2%, about
one thousand are obtained by setting the levels of the guarantee product attributes, i.e. the
capital guarantee g and the interest rate rG, to the lowest values while setting the levels of
the attributes in the products, i.e. the interest rates rG, rA and rO, to their highest values.
Furthermore and for comparison, a mere number of about 400 individual shares below 2% are
obtained when setting the guarantee product’s attributes to the highest levels and the alterna-
tive products’ attributes to the lowest levels. In the subsequent paragraphs, we remain with the
metric of the average of individual shares along products. By considering this single measure,
we are still able to highlight general patterns in overall preferences while keeping the discussion
rather simple.
In Figure 8, we present the average individual shares for the four products along the at-
tribute and level combinations. The combinations are ordered with respect to the average share
choosing the guarantee product, i.e. on the left-hand side of the graph we find the lowest aver-
age shares while on the right-hand share we have the highest shares for the guarantee product.
The minimum average share in the guarantee product starts at 29% and is complemented by
shares of 20%, 17% and 34% in the real-estate, anti-cyclic and opportunity products, respec-
tively. While for the aforementioned individual shares it is difficult to identify a clear pattern,
we note that the lowest average share in guarantee product is obtained when setting the prod-
uct attributes to the lowest levels, i.e. capital guarantee g = 90% and interest rate rG = 2.4%,
while considering the other products’ attributes at their highest levels (rG = 6.0%, rA = 6.0%
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and rO = 7.2%). This observation underlines two main ideas. On the one hand, in that specific
setting, the average share of the opportunity product exceeds the one of the guarantee product
indicating that there exist cases where customers prefer the opportunity product. Indeed, plau-
sible product design in a given market setting can affect customer preferences and deviate their
choice from the guarantee product. Further, the opportunity product lets potential customers
design their own investment strategy by selecting the funds in which to invest. The associated
strategy is medium-term and allows clients to reallocate assets in secure investments. Therefore,
investments in risky assets can provide higher utility. On the other hand, one can also see that,
even within the most unfavorable combination of attribute levels in the guarantee product, a
non-negligible amount of respondents still show preferences for this product. This lets us hy-
pothesize either that individuals might have non-rational preferences toward guarantees (Allais,
1953; Diecidue et al., 2004; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012) or that other benefits not considered
in this study, e.g. tax-privileges, influence customer decisions (Chen et al., 2019). As an ex-
ample, since 2008, the German State sponsors subsidizes the Riester-Rente product with 175
Euro per saver and 300 Euro per child. In addition, contributions of up to 2 100 Euro can be
deducted from the income as “special expenses”, hence reducing income tax.4 The maximum
average share for the guarantee product is obtained when its attributes are set to their highest
levels, i.e. capital guaranteed g = 110% and interest rate rG = 2.4% and when the attribute
levels of the other products are at their lowest levels (rG = 4.0%, rA = 4.0% and rO = 4.8%). In
this particular case, we find an average share of 62% for the guarantee product and mean shares
of 11%, 8% and 19% for the real estate, anti-cyclic and opportunity products. Comparing these
results with the combination of attributes reporting the lowest average share for the guarantee
product, we note that the mean shares of the real estate and the anti-cyclic products have been
reduced by a factor of about 2 (from 20% to 11% respectively from 17% to 8%). The average
share in the opportunity product is slightly less reduced from 34% to 19.0%.
Finally, we consider the distribution of the shares of preferences along selected demographic,
socio-related and economic savings factors. In Figure 9, we show the shares of preferences by
products for the gender, age, yearly gross income and savings motivation factors. For the four
products, we only report the preferences for a “baseline” scenario with the following attributes
levels’ values: capital guarantee g = 100% and interest rates of rG = 2.0%, rG = 4.0%, rA =
4.0% and rO = 4.8%. This scenario refers to the product configurations one often found in
practice at the time of running the survey. Although the prevailing interest rates have now
decreased to 0% or even to negative rates in the financial market, the issue of guarantees is
still very relevant. In each graph, we lay out the 95% confidence interval. When considering
the results, we do not observe significant differences along covariates. In fact, for a given
product alternative, confidence corridors from different covariates’ values overlap with each
other. Nonetheless, we can comment on observed trends. Among the surveyed, males present
slightly higher preferences than female for the guarantee product while women, when compared
to men, show higher a share of preferences for the opportunity product. The share of preferences
toward the opportunity product decrease with age. Respondents in the 18–24 years age class
present the greater preference while the lowest shares appear for the oldest. In graphs (c) and (d)
of Figure 9 we have chosen to report the results along the yearly gross income and the savings
motivation as examples for the social and economic factors. In both selected cases as with the
other factors (see Figure 10 in the Appendix) we do not observe a clear pattern. Thus, no clear
4See the website of BMF at www.bundesfinanzministerium.de.
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Figure 9: Shares of preferences by products for selected covariates.
segmentation of customers can be derived from these results. While a multivariate analysis by
combining several explanatory factors would be of great interest, the limited number of records
and large number of covariates (and category levels within each factor) hinders us to obtain
further reliable results.
Product switching behavior To understand how preferences are affected by different val-
ues of the attributes, we adopt a scenario-based ceteris paribus analysis by observing the share
of preferences when modifying one attribute level value while keeping the other levels fixed
at their “base” level. In our approach, base attribute levels correspond to the levels taken
for the aforementioned baseline scenario, i.e. a capital guarantee g = 100% and interest
rates rG = 2.0%, rR = 4.0%, rA = 4.0% and rO = 4.8%. We define 11 profiles denoted from A
to K that deviate from the baseline profile. For each characteristics’ profile, we report the share
of preferences for the guarantee sG, real estate sR, anti-cyclic sA and opportunity sO products.
Alongside and in brackets, we give the percentage point variation in product shares ∆G, ∆R,
∆A and ∆O when preferences are compared to the baseline share. The results are presented in
Table 4.
In the base scenario (cf. row “Base” in Table 4), we note that sG = 47.0% of the participants
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would decide for the guarantee product, although the other products offer at least double as
high expected returns when compared to the guaranteed interest. In this set-up, among the
alternative products without guarantees, the opportunity product promising a higher expected
return is most popular (sO = 25.0%). While pledging the same expected rate of return, more
customers would head towards the real estate (sR = 15.6%) when compared to the anti-cyclic
product (sA = 12.4%). This indicates that the product description and the underlying in-
vestment concept makes a difference. Alternative characteristics are considered in profiles A
and B where the capital guarantee g and guaranteed interest rate rG attributes are changed
while keeping all other levels constant. In these profiles we modify both attribute levels because
the capital guarantee and guaranteed interest are linked to each other (Section 3.1). While
adapting g, we set the guaranteed returns rG to their lowest level (cf. Table 1). In profile A,
we observe that the share for the guarantee product decreases by 9.2 percentage points. This
important decrease highlights the importance of the capital guarantee for participants in their
product selection. The result can also be derived from profile B since the average share of
preferences for the guarantee product increase by 7.2 percentage points linked to the higher g.
These results are in line with customer surveys on investments and retirement products indi-
cating that for almost 80% of German consumers, having a guarantee on the paid-in capital is
the main investing criteria (Bundesverband Deutscher Banken, 2011; INSA, 2018). Only 13%
of them would accept a lower safety level on their savings capital if a higher return can be
expected. In the profiles C and D, we observe variations in the preferences when only changing
the promised interest rate. By setting the return guarantee to rG = 2.5% and rG = 3.0%, we
report absolute increases in the guarantee product of 4.0 and 8.5 percentage points, respectively.
In these scenarios, the other products experience decrease of about 1 to 3 percentage points.
The following profiles showcase the results for selected variations of the product landscape in
the products without formal guarantees. Profiles E and K consider higher expected returns for
Profile Characteristics Guarantee Real estate Anti-cyclic Opportunity
g rG rR rA rO sG (∆G) sR (∆R) sA (∆A) sO (∆O)
Base 100 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.8 47.0 – 15.6 – 12.4 – 25.0 –
A 90 2.4 4.0 4.0 4.8 37.8 (−9.2) 18.7 (+3.1) 14.6 (+2.2) 28.9 (+3.9)
B 110 1.6 4.0 4.0 4.8 54.2 (+7.2) 13.0 (−2.6) 10.5 (−1.9) 22.2 (−2.8)
C 100 2.5 4.0 4.0 4.8 51.0 (+4.0) 14.2 (−1.4) 11.4 (−1.0) 23.4 (−1.6)
D 100 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.8 55.5 (+8.5) 12.8 (−2.8) 10.2 (−2.2) 21.5 (−3.5)
E 100 2.0 5.0 4.0 4.8 45.4 (−1.6) 21.3 (+5.7) 10.4 (−2.0) 23.0 (−2.0)
F 100 2.0 6.0 4.0 4.8 43.3 (−3.7) 26.9 (+11.3) 8.7 (−3.7) 21.1 (−3.9)
G 100 2.0 4.0 5.0 4.8 45.5 (−1.5) 13.1 (−2.5) 18.8 (+6.4) 22.6 (−2.4)
H 100 2.0 4.0 6.0 4.8 43.5 (−3.5) 10.9 (−4.7) 26.0 (+13.6) 19.6 (−5.4)
I 100 2.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 44.8 (−2.2) 13.4 (−2.2) 10.1 (−2.3) 31.7 (+6.7)
J 100 2.0 4.0 4.0 7.2 41.8 (−5.2) 11.7 (−3.9) 8.3 (−4.1) 38.2 (+13.2)
K 100 2.0 6.0 6.0 7.2 37.8 (−9.2) 17.1 (+1.5) 14.8 (+2.4) 30.2 (+5.2)
Note: All values are expressed in %. The columns “sG”, “sR”, “sA” and “sO” report the share of
preferences for the guarantee, real estate, anti-cyclic and opportunity products, respectively. We denote
by “(∆G)”, “(∆R)”, “(∆A)” and “(∆O)” the columns laying out the percentage point variation when compared
to the base scenario for the guarantee, real estate, anti-cyclic and opportunity products, respectively.
Table 4: Evolution of the average share of preferences when varying attribute level values.
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the real estate product, namely rR = 5.0% and rR = 6.0%. Under such conditions, the shares
for the real estate product increase by 5.7 respectively 11.3 percentage points. It is important to
note that only few people would switch from the guarantee product to the real estate product
(cf. the small ∆G). Potential switching behavior becomes even more obvious for profiles G
and H when higher returns for the anti-cyclic product are expected, namely rA = 5.0% and
rA = 6.0%. While the increase in shares of preferences for the anti-cyclic product is higher than
in the previous profiles for real estate, our outcomes show that the share of people willing to
switch over from the guarantee product is lower. This supports our earlier finding, that besides
the expected return, the product description matters to customers. Profiles I and J show the re-
sults when increasing the expected returns for the opportunity product to the levels rO = 6.0%
and rO = 7.2%. From the product description, this product offers the highest flexibility to the
insureds. Customers can pick an investment strategy out of a selection of funds. Apparently
customers who are not used to managing assets themselves are put off by the higher individ-
ual responsibility. When the expected return rO is 6.0%, the average shares of preferences for
the guarantee, real estate and anti-cyclic products are reduced by about 2.2%. By setting the
expected return rO to 7.2%, we observe an impact that is more than two times higher on the
guarantee product share (∆G = −5.2) than in profile I.
Finally, in profile K, we set the expected returns of the real-estate, anti-cyclic and oppor-
tunity products to their highest levels while keeping the base attribute levels for the guarantee
product. Although the guaranteed return in the guarantee product is three times smaller than
the expected return in the alternative products, the guarantee product remains the most popular
product with a share of 37.8%. Participants that move away from the guarantee product rather
switch to the opportunity product (∆O = +5.2%), which proposes the highest expected re-
turn. Consequently, insurance companies have to carefully develop alternative schemes without
formal guarantees that target well-defined groups of customers with adequately fitting prod-
uct features. Simply showcasing higher expected returns will not convince customers that put
the focus on the capital guarantee. We also observe that the product description and the un-
derlying investment concepts matter to the participants – even when the same level of return
is expected. For products with a high level of flexibility and individual decision-making in
the investment schemes, the customer only switches when the remuneration is higher than for
managed products.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the research on consumer preferences for participating life insurance
contracts, taking into account demographic, socio-related and economic savings factors. The
data used in this study stems from a unique private survey conducted among individuals in
Germany. We use the framework of a CBC analysis as well as the HB model to understand
customer preferences toward life insurance products including guarantees. Within this sur-
vey, individuals have to choose their preferred option among four participating life insurance
schemes. During the study, individuals always face the same product alternatives however with
varying expected returns and with or without capital guarantee. Based on the respondents’
answers, we compute part-worth utilities and relative importance by attribute levels as well as
shares of preferences towards the four participating life insurance contracts. This allows us to
highlight product features that most affect customer decisions. Finally, we analyze the overall
respondent preferences for products including guarantees and study the potential switching be-
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havior when making the preferred product less attractive. We find that individuals have strong
preferences for life insurance products offering guarantees even when higher expected rates are
possible in alternative products without guarantees. In this context, the product structure as
well as the amount of guaranteed capital are the most important attributes in terms of customer
preferences. In particular, participants prefer the combination “high capital guarantee with low
interest rate guarantee” over a combination with “low capital guarantee and high guaranteed
interest rate”.
Considering individual preferences, we note that they are heterogeneous and that no clear
pattern can be derived when considering the participants’ demographics, socio-related and eco-
nomic savings factors. However, when reporting the average share of preferences among all
individuals, we are able to identify groups and, in particular, potential switching behavior from
contracts with guarantees. We find that the favorite alternative product is the opportunity
product, i.e. a product letting individuals design their own investment strategy with the possi-
bility to reallocate assets in secure investments during unfavorable market development periods.
Nevertheless, no matter the attribute level combination, the average share of preferences for this
product always remains below the share of preferences for the guarantee product. In fact, our
results show that the guarantee product with the lowest interest rate guarantee level and a 100%
capital guarantee is still preferred by more participants than any alternative product even when
the expected returns are up to three times higher. To attract customers towards products with-
out guarantees, insurers have to develop alternatives targeting well-defined customer groups.
In such context, accounting for socio-demographic factors and savings motivations may lead
to adequate solutions along customer profiles. However, further research is necessary since we
cannot clearly identify such patterns from our data. Product characteristics seem to be relevant
factors that shape customer decisions and in particular we find that the product scheme and un-
derlying investment concept matters to customers. Respondents show clear preferences for real
estate investments when compared to anti-cyclic products, although they are quasi identical.
Beyond the current study, several streams of research require further investigation. First,
the survey on which we base our study focuses on pure preferences of customers without con-
sidering monetary aspects. While we derive results that are of high relevance for insurance
companies, we also think that adding information on the willingness to pay for each participat-
ing life insurance scheme could bring an alternative measure of preferences (Gatzert et al., 2011;
Braun et al., 2016). Second, accounting for life events affecting customers, e.g., their first job,
child birth, and retirement could remove part of the heterogeneity observed in individual shares
of preferences since those events might trigger insurance purchases. Third, although our study
has not shown evidence of some particular socio-economic factors, we believe that future studies
should still be carried out with regard to covariates. Indeed, when including the price or value
of the products, different behaviors might appear. Further the limited number of observations
does not allow to combine covariates to find proper customer segmentations. In future research,
it could be interesting to see how our results link to work done on risk aversion behavior.
Life insurance business has become more difficult in the last years. While solvency require-
ments and financial market conditions hinder insurers to propose long-term guaranteed interest
rates and capital guarantees in many countries, customers are still seeking for security and
returns. Given that guaranteed products always appear as favorites, our study confirms that
from a business perspective it does not seem reasonable to eliminate all guarantees. For the
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insurance sector, this implies that the transition to alternative products should be done by
fostering hybrid products. In fact, current trends in Germany show that the fastest growing
segment within the annuities and pension products are not classic with-profit products or pure
unit-linked insurance but hybrid forms with guarantees, reaching almost 30% of new business
in life insurance by type of product (GDV, 2019). Further, the life insurance business is often
affected by policies towards tax-deductible amounts and taxes applied to returns. Therefore, the
magnitude of the capital guarantee can be fiscally more advantageous than the other interest
rates since a more favorable taxation may relate. Hereby, the State and regulators play an im-
portant role since they define the playing field. Our study does not provide information on the
creation of customer segments (see the discussion above). Further customer studies are needed
to enable insurers to tailor their product offerings and target customer groups with appropriate
hybrid products. Despite the mentioned limitations, our analysis provides insights for insurers
in an area where consumer studies are scarce. We extend the literature on preferences for capital
and interest rate guarantees within participating life insurance contracts, i.e. in an area where
the life insurance industry in German-speaking countries faces major challenges nowadays.
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Note: Confidence intervals are given at the 95% level. In the graph (d), the confidence interval for
the “No school degree” group is not available due to insufficient data (cf. Table 3).
Figure 10: Shares of preferences by products for additional covariates.
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